United Nations, New York, 18 February, 2011 -
With 80 per cent of the world's people lacking adequate social protection and global inequalities growing, top United Nations officials are calling for a new era of social justice that offers basic services, decently paid jobs, and safeguards for the poor, vulnerable and marginalized.
"Social justice is more than an ethical imperative; it is a foundation for national stability and global prosperity," Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a message ahead of the World Day of Social Justice, observed on 20 February. "Equal opportunity, solidarity and respect for human rights, these are essential to unlocking the full productive potential of nations and peoples
Because our Gov Is A Fail .........
In March 2006, the Cherokee Nation's Supreme Court ruled that the descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen were unjustly kept for over 20 years from enrolling as citizens. They were allowed to register and to become enrolled citizens of the Cherokee Nation. Principal Chief Chad "Corntassel" Smith called for an emergency election to amend the constitution. A petition for a vote to remove the Freedmen descendants was circulated and Chief Smith held an emergency election. [1] As a result of the amendment's approval in a referendum, the Freedmen descendants were removed from the Cherokee Nation tribal rolls. They have continued to press for their treaty rights and recognition as tribal members
Sanders asserts that because federal case law to date has not developed a uniform definition for "cocaine base," the statute is unconstitutionally vague because his conduct may or may not fall within § 841(a)(1) depending on how "cocaine base" is defined. Sanders has the burden of demonstrating that § 841(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Cherry, 983 F.2d 748, 754 (7th Cir.1991). In challenging a statute as void for vagueness, the defendant-appellant is initially required to establish that § 841(a)(1) fails to "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983); United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 726 (7th Cir.1992). More importantly, Sanders must establish that the statute fails to "establish minimal guidelines to govern the discretion of law enforcement officials." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. at 1858-59; Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d at 726. The defendant-appellant does not argue that § 841 fails to define the criminal offenses for which he was convicted, rather he contends that the § 841(a)(1) prohibition against distributing cocaine base fails to "establish minimal guidelines to govern the discretion of law enforcement officials" because the federal courts have not arrived at a uniform, consistent definition of what constitutes "cocaine base." It is true that neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines contains a definition of cocaine base, United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 416 (9th Cir.1991), and that the circuit courts are not in complete agreement on the substance's identifying characteristics. Compare United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1134-35 (1st Cir.1992) with Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416. However all the circuits which have addressed the question agree that cocaine base includes "crack." See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir.1992); Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d at 1134-35; Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416; United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 974 (1991); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 976 (D.C.Cir.1988).
|
The American Revolution was the death knell of Northern slavery. The rhetoric of the rebels, based on the Enlightenment doctrine of “natural rights,” immediately ran into the hypocrisy of a slave-owning people crying out for freedom. Tory Samuel Johnson twitted the Americans in 1775: "How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?" The rebels were sensitive to the taunt. “To contend for liberty and to deny that blessing to others,” John Jay wrote, “involves an inconsistency not to be excused.” Nathaniel Niles put it succinctly: “For shame, let us either cease to enslave our fellow-men, or else let us cease to complain of those that would enslave us.” James Otis found another thread in the argument when he wrote, “It is a clear truth that those who every day barter away other men’s liberty, will soon care little for their own.”[1]
The Cherokee Freedmen Controversy is an ongoing political and tribal dispute between the administration of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen related to their tribal membership. After the American Civil War, slaves held by Cherokee were freed, and the Cherokee Freedmen were made citizens of the tribe in accordance with an act of the Cherokee National Council in 1863. A treaty made with the United States government in 1866 further cemented the freedmen's place as Cherokee citizens, giving them and their descendants federally protected rights to citizenship. The Freedmen were Cherokee Nation citizens until the early 1980s. The Cherokee Nation stripped them of voting rights and citizenship, a situation that lasted for more than two decades |
|
|
|
|
|
No comments:
Post a Comment